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ABSTRACT: Virtue ethics is the oldest model of moral 
philosophy, but since the Renaissance it has been relegated to 
second place with the emergence of the Kantian duty-based ethics 
and the consequentialism of Bentham and Mill. In the context 
of healthcare, ethical theories centered on virtue and character 
continued to be prevalent until the 1970s, when bioethics emerged 
as a new area of knowledge that seeks to reflect on the ethical 
implications resulting from scientific and technological advances 
on human and animal life, and on the environment. There was a 
paradigm shift in healthcare ethics, from a model based on virtue 
and on the inviolability of human life, expressed in the Hippocratic 
Oath, to a model based on the autonomy and quality of life of 
the patient, to which contributed the principlism of Beauchamp 
and Childress and the growing influence of utilitarianism in the 
ethics committees. In recent years, there has been a renewed 
interest on virtue-based ethics due to the contribution of thinkers 
such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Edmund 
D. Pellegrino. A review on virtue ethics was carried out from 
the works of Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma, 
pioneers of bioethics and the main promoters of virtue ethics in 
clinical practice, as well as after research on the subject in the 
NCBI/PubMed (National Center for Biotechnology Information) 
and SciELO (Scientific Electronic Library Online) databases. 
After a presentation of the history of the philosophical concept of 
virtue and the most representative aspects of virtue ethics, eight 
virtues particularly relevant to clinical practice are emphasized: 
fidelity to promise, compassion, prudence, justice, courage, 
moderation, integrity, and altruism. These and other virtues 
are, in our opinion, essential for a more humane healthcare that 
considers the patient’s good and will contribute to counterbalance 
the hegemony of principlism and ethical theories that devalue the 
central role of the agent in the current bioethical debate.
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RESUMO: A teoria ética das virtudes é o modelo mais antigo de 
filosofia moral, mas a partir do Renascimento foi relegada para 
segundo plano com o surgimento da ética kantiana do dever e 
do consequencialismo de Bentham e Mill. No âmbito da saúde, 
as teorias éticas centradas na virtude e no caráter continuaram a 
ser preponderantes até aos anos 70 do século passado, quando 
surgiu a bioética como uma nova área do saber, que procura 
refletir sobre as implicações éticas resultantes dos progressos 
científicos e tecnológicos na vida humana e animal, e no ambiente. 
Assistiu-se a uma mudança de paradigma na ética dos cuidados 
de saúde, de um modelo baseado na virtude e na inviolabilidade 
da vida humana, expresso no Juramento de Hipócrates, para um 
modelo cimentado na autonomia e qualidade de vida do paciente, 
para o que contribuiu a proposta da metodologia principialista de 
Beauchamp e Childress e da crescente influência do utilitarismo 
nas comissões de ética. Nos últimos anos, tem havido um interesse 
renovado pelas teorias éticas da virtude devido ao contributo de 
pensadores como Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre e 
Edmund D. Pellegrino. Foi realizada uma revisão sobre a teoria 
ética das virtudes a partir das obras de Edmund D. Pellegrino 
e David C. Thomasma, pioneiros da bioética e dos principais 
promotores da ética das virtudes na prática clínica, bem como após 
pesquisa do tema nas bases de dados NCBI/PubMed (National 
Center for Biotechnology Information) e SciELO (Scientific 
Electronic Library Online). Após uma apresentação da história do 
conceito filosófico de virtude e dos aspetos mais representativos 
da teoria ética das virtudes, são destacadas oito virtudes 
particularmente relevantes para a atividade clínica: a fidelidade 
à promessa, a compaixão, a prudência, a justiça, a coragem, a 
moderação, a integridade e o altruísmo. Estas e outras virtudes 
são, em nossa opinião, essenciais para uma prática médica mais 
humanizada que tenha em conta o bem do paciente, e contribuirão 
também para contrabalançar a hegemonia do principialismo e 
de teorias éticas que desvalorizem o papel central do agente no 
debate bioético atual.
Palavras-chave: Virtudes; Ética médica; Teoria ética; Bioética.
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INTRODUCTION
Virtue ethics is the oldest model of moral philosophy1. In the golden period of Greek 
antiquity, Plato’s dialogues and the works of Aristotle 
introduced and developed the concept of virtue as the 
excellence of a person’s character, which had an enormous 
influence on Western thought until our days.
Duty-based ethics and utilitarianism, more 
widespread and influential in contemporary moral 
philosophy and bioethics, focus the reflection on the action 
itself - what should I do? The first seeking to establish 
universal norms, rules and principles that regulate actions, 
and the second analyzing the predictable consequences 
of actions to obtain the maximum benefit for the greatest 
number of people. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the role of the agent in ethical decisions - how 
should I live? or what kind of person should I be? In fact, 
how each person interprets and applies a certain principle 
or norm or assesses the usefulness of a certain course of 
action, always depends ultimately on their character and 
motivations2.
The classical theories of virtue hold that virtuous 
people are best prepared to make the right decisions 
according to circumstances, not needing a moral code that 
tells them not to lie or harm others. As Roger Crisp and 
Michael Slote3 point out, while for a follower of Kant the 
reason that one should not lie is because lying goes against 
the moral law, and for a utilitarian for not bringing the 
greatest benefit, for an advocate of a virtue ethics this is 
simply because it is a dishonest behavior.
Virtue as excellence
The Greek word for virtue, areté, refers to qualities 
not necessarily moral, and should be translated more 
correctly as excellence. The concept of areté was not only 
associated with human action. It was also an attribute of 
animals, vegetables, or objects. The areté of a rose was its 
beauty and pleasant aroma, the areté of a knife would be 
the greater the better it fulfilled its function of cutting. This 
ancient meaning of the term areté is found in the epic poems 
of Homer and Hesiod and was used by the sophists. The 
heroic virtues of Achilles, Ulysses, and other characters of 
the Homeric texts were exclusively masculine and included 
bravery, dexterity, patriotism, and honor4,5. The use of the 
term areté as excellence of character or moral excellence 
was introduced in philosophical reflection by Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle. This ethical-moral sense of the concept 
of virtue overlapped the original and is the basis of virtue 
ethics. The four cardinal virtues of antiquity – practical 
wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice – described by 
Plato in The Republic are virtues of character, relating to 
the conduct of man. According to this philosopher, these 
four virtues must be considered a unique entity so that we 
can live in harmony and are fundamental for the well-being 
and progress of the person and society6.
Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual or 
dianoetic virtues, such as wisdom (sophia), science 
(episteme) and prudence (phronesis), which are related 
to knowledge and contemplation, and moral or character 
virtues, such as moderation or courage. He defines virtue 
as a trait of character of a person manifested in the usual 
action, which leads them to perform their role well (i.e. 
with excellence). Virtue is not just a feeling about what 
is good or a mere ability to make a correct choice. It is, 
above all, an active, voluntary, and persistent disposition 
to practice good in all circumstances and not occasionally 
and can be cultivated by teaching and practice. It is not 
simply a conditioned reflex, but an inner disposition or habit 
(ethos) directed by reason, regulated by practical wisdom 
or prudence (phronesis) and perfected by experience. This 
habit has a teleological quality, that is, it has in view a 
certain purpose or end (telos), which consists in fulfilling 
a certain task in the best way possible. Thus, we can say 
that virtue ethics is teleological because it is developed 
according to the specific ends of a given activity, not in 
the consequential sense of utility2.
The Stagirite considers that moral virtues should 
seek the middle ground or equilibrium point between 
a defect and an excess, which should be avoided. This 
middle ground is universal, but it depends on individual 
characteristics and on circumstances, being determined 
rationally by practical wisdom2. The virtue of courage, 
for this philosopher, would be the middle ground between 
cowardice and fearlessness, the latter being excessive or 
inadequate trust; moderation would be the middle ground 
between detachment and dissoluteness; generosity, the 
middle ground between avarice and prodigality. Some 
authors consider this to be one of the weakest and most 
controversial ideas of the Greek philosopher7,8. One of 
the arguments that disarms the Aristotelian definition of 
virtue as the middle ground between two extremes is the 
impossibility of someone being exceedingly fair or honest 
or righteous.
The decline of virtues ethics in renaissance and 
modernity
In the realm of moral philosophy, the concept of 
virtue is considered a character trait of a person that leads 
them to act correctly in the usual way2. This understanding 
of virtues as a positive and appreciated moral quality was 
maintained during the classical and medieval periods, 
based on the works of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. 
Since the Renaissance, virtue ethics began to be devalued 
with the appearance of other theories of moral philosophy, 
particularly the Kantian duty-based ethics and the 
consequentialism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
As a result of the influence of rationalism and the works 
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of Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche, 
there has been a progressive decline in virtue-centered 
ethics, although the last few decades have seen a recovery 
of this approach in moral philosophy and bioethics.
The Italian Renaissance politician Niccolò 
Machiavelli in his book The Prince, published in 1513 
and considered one of the most famous treaties of politics, 
recommends what a ruler must do to remain in power. He 
uses the term virtue in the sense of willpower, cunning, 
violence, and domination, political and military, totally 
distinct from the usual meaning of Aristotelian roots. We 
find an example of the emphasis given to cunning in the 
following excerpt from Machiavelli’s main work9: Never 
has a prince lacked legitimate reasons to break faith. I could 
give you infinite examples from modern times, and show 
you numerous peace treaties and promises that have been 
broken and made completely empty by the faithlessness of 
princes: these knew well how to use the ways of the fox, and 
they are the ones who succeed (…) for the majority of men 
are simple and will only follow the needs of the present, so 
that the deceiver can always find someone he can deceive. 
For this author, trying to live virtuously in a world where 
many do not do so puts his own survival at risk. In the wake 
of Machiavelli, as Pellegrino and Thomasma7 observe, 
physicians and lawyers are increasingly of the opinion that 
virtue and ethics are fine ideals, but that they are impossible 
to follow in our competitive, free-market, bureaucratized 
society. This Machiavellian spirit, in the sense that virtues 
are considered an obstacle to success and prosperity, is 
present in a purely commercial conception of healthcare.
The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, in 
the 17th century, developed a moral philosophy based 
on a pessimistic view of human nature, distinct from 
the classical-medieval perspective, clearly optimistic. 
According to this author, people are motivated by selfish 
interests, which manifest themselves in the desire to 
preserve their lives and enjoy pleasure, avoiding pain and 
harm from others. He considers that it is the individual’s 
interest that determines what is good or bad, virtues and 
vices being a matter of personal preference. For the author 
of Leviathan, strength and fraud were virtues, and fame 
and profit should be the main human motivations7. Other 
authors, along the lines of Hobbes, tried to define the 
concept of virtue from psychology, genetics, or culture, 
such as the philosopher and writer Ayn Rand10 in The 
Virtue of Selfishness, in which she defends the right of the 
human being to benefit from his moral acts and condemns 
the traditional perspective on virtues for considering it 
contrary to professional success and economic prosperity.
At the end of the 19th century, the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche rejected the traditional 
Judeo-Christian morality, and considered that the virtues 
were meant for simple mortals with a slave morality and 
not for the new and superior human being (Übermensch) 
he idealized. He should achieve “virtue” devoid of all 
moral elements, using the classical, non-moral meaning of 
the term2. According to the American historian Gertrude 
Himmelfarb11, it was only in the 20th century that there 
was a marked relativization of the foundations of morality, 
so that traditional virtues were replaced by values. In her 
opinion, this was the greatest philosophical revolution 
of modernity, and Nietzsche, especially in his book The 
Genealogy of Morals, was the main protagonist of this 
paradigm shift.
At the beginning of the 20th century Max Weber, 
one of the founders of modern sociology, was the one 
who used the term value more widely although, unlike 
Nietzsche, without nihilistic intentions. In his book The 
Sociology of Religion, published in 1720, Weber uses the 
word virtue only when referring to religious virtues, and 
this reductive and sometimes pejorative connotation of the 
term has prevailed to this day. In today’s society, the idea 
that many people have of virtue is related to sexual morality, 
being understood as chastity or marital fidelity11. However, 
while virtues are generally considered positive and 
meritorious habits or behavior that transcend the person, 
values do not always have the same meaning. In fact, 
they may not even be virtues, but only feelings, opinions, 
beliefs, preferences, or social conventions. They are what a 
person or a community values, thus having a subjective and 
circumstantial character. As Himmelfarb11 points out, one 
cannot say of virtues, as one can of values, that anyone’s 
virtues are as good as anyone else’s, or that everyone 
has a right to his own virtues. Thus, to be faithful to the 
classical concept of virtue, we cannot replace it by value, 
which although more widespread in everyday language 
does not have the same meaning. All virtues are values, but 
not all values can be considered virtues12. For this reason, 
the eminent Portuguese physician and bioethicist Daniel 
Serrão13 argues that it is necessary to propose virtues, as 
incarnate as possible, and not abstract values laboriously 
created by generations of philosophers.
The resurgence of virtue ethics today
One of the factors that contributed to a renewed 
interest in virtue ethics was the publication, in 1958, 
of the article “Modern Moral Philosophy” by the 
British philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. In this essay, 
Anscombe14 criticizes the supremacy of deontological 
and utilitarian ethics, which seek to establish universal 
moral principles to be followed by duty or obligation, as if 
human action were subject to a universal divine legislator 
in whom the proponents of these theories do not believe. 
She thus advocates a return to a virtue-based ethics of 
Aristotelian roots, more suited to the moral heterogeneity 
and secularization of modern societies. As a result of this 
insightful text written by Anscombe, other philosophers 
have sought to fill some gaps identified by this author in 
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Kantian and consequentialist ethics, developing virtue 
ethics approaches from these two influential models of 
moral philosophy.
The work After Virtue of the Scottish philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre15, was perhaps the most remarkable 
and significant contribution to a wider acceptance of virtue 
ethics in contemporary moral philosophy and bioethical 
reflection. After a well-founded critique of the hegemony 
of ethical theories based on rights, duties, and consequences 
in today’s society, he advocates the importance of a return 
to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. MacIntyre argues 
that virtues are based on human professional practices or 
activities, and it is the responsibility of the executors of 
these practices to develop standards of excellence (which he 
called internal goods) appropriate to this activity. Virtues, 
for this author15, are the qualities that allow one to attain 
the internal or intrinsic goods of a certain practice. The 
search for these goods will allow the establishment of 
moral communities that recognize the narrative unity of 
human beings and value their historical, sociological, and 
cultural legacy.
In the context of healthcare, ethical theories based 
on virtue and character have prevailed longer than in society 
at large, where, as we have seen, there has been a decline in 
this approach since the Renaissance. The Hippocratic Oath 
of the 5th century BC, the oldest code of professional ethics, 
was clearly based on a model of virtue and beneficence, 
and the same is observed in all treaties of medical ethics 
of antiquity, such as the Chinese or the Indian, as well as 
in the codes of ethics of Thomas Percival, James Gregory, 
and John Gregory, who practiced medicine in the United 
Kingdom in the 18th century7. Hippocrates urged the doctor 
to carry out his profession with purity and honesty. The 
Geneva Declaration of the World Medical Association, 
promulgated in 1948 following the Nuremberg Trials, 
states: I will practice my profession with conscience and 
dignity, and I will maintain by all the means in my power, the 
honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession. 
Most of these documents recognize that the care of patient 
cannot be provided exclusively through the fulfilment of 
deontological norms, being duty and virtue two sides of 
the same coin.
Since the 1970s, which corresponds to the period 
in which bioethics emerged as a new area of knowledge, 
there has been a paradigm shift in healthcare ethics, from 
a model based on virtue and on the inviolability of human 
life, expressed in the Hippocratic Oath, to a model based 
on the autonomy and quality of life of the patient, to which 
contributed the principlist approach of Beauchamp and 
Childress and the growing influence of utilitarianism on 
ethics committees.
In a seminal article entitled “The Metamorphosis of 
Medical Ethics”, published in 1993, Edmund Pellegrino1 
points out that medical ethics had changed more in the 
last decades than over the 2500 years of its history. This 
metamorphosis of medical ethics, more evident and of 
greater proportions in the USA, but rapidly spreading 
to other countries, has profoundly altered the doctor-
patient relationship, giving rise to new models, such as 
a commercial and a contractual, largely as a reaction to 
the paternalism of the Hippocratic tradition. Pellegrino16 
identifies some of the causes that contributed to this 
change, not all of them negative. They include profound 
transformations of a political, social, economic, and cultural 
nature, among which participatory democracy is considered 
the political system of choice, the growing moral pluralism 
and heterogeneity of modern societies, the influence of the 
media, the devaluation of the role of religion as a source 
of morality, the widespread mistrust of all manifestations 
of authority, and the increasing power given to doctors by 
scientific and technological advances.
Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma17, the 
main representatives of virtue ethics in the context of 
healthcare, believe that it is possible to reach a consensus 
about the good of the patient and the virtues in professional 
ethics, after the nature and purpose of medicine, based on 
the phenomenology of the clinical encounter, contrary to 
what happens in society in general, pluralist and secular, 
where we are moral strangers. The emphasis of these 
authors on the character and virtue of the healthcare 
professional is based on a philosophy of medicine and on 
the principle of beneficence-in-trust in the doctor-patient 
relationship.
Virtue ethics and a more humane medicine
The main apologists of the ethical theories of 
virtue in bioethics and medical ethics have developed their 
thinking from the doctor-patient relationship. James Drane18 
proposes benevolence, respect, compassion, kindness, and 
justice as fundamental virtues of the doctor. Beauchamp 
and Childress19 highlight four virtues in the activity of 
healthcare professionals: compassion, discernment, probity, 
and integrity. Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma7, 
in their book The Virtues in Medical Practice, identify 
eight fundamental virtues from a phenomenological 
approach carried out within the philosophy of medicine: 
fidelity to promise, compassion, prudence, justice, courage, 
moderation, integrity, and altruism. All these virtues are 
related to the purposes of medicine and can be identified 
at the clinical encounter. Pellegrino20 stresses that these 
character traits are included not because they are excellent, 
but because they are essential to fulfil the objectives and 
purposes of medicine. These purposes stem from the 
reality of the doctor-patient relationship and not from 
social conventions, consensus or agreements. In other 
publications, Pellegrino21 also mentions benevolence, care, 
intellectual honesty, humility, and truthfulness, and points 
out that other virtues could also be added.
According to Pellegrino and Thomasma7, the aim 
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of virtue ethics is the search for excellence, in which one 
intends to “hit the target”, that is, to fulfil the purpose of 
carrying out a certain action in the best way possible. This 
purpose is much more demanding than the fulfilment of 
deontological norms or legal obligations, placing the target 
on a higher level than the strict observance of the letter of 
the law. According to these authors, the greatest difference 
between this ethical theory and the deontological and 
consequentialist theories manifests itself in the approach 
to the most ambiguous and controversial ethical problems. 
Healthcare professionals who govern their acts according 
to a virtue ethics perspective will not participate in certain 
activities about which the law is omissive or condescending. 
On the other hand, the professional who governs their 
conduct according to a virtue ethics approach does not 
make their decisions to be appreciated or recognized by 
their peers or by society, nor do they consider self-benefit 
as the main motivation for their conduct. They try to act 
correctly in all situations, both in public and private7.
We will then briefly present the eight virtues that 
Pellegrino and Thomasma consider indispensable for the 
exercise of the medical profession. The observance of these 
and other virtues will contribute significantly to alleviating 
the recognized lack of humanization of healthcare services, 
which is the most pressing ethical problem in the practice 
of medicine.
Fidelity to trust
We can define this virtue as being the commitment 
or fidelity to the promise that the doctor solemnly swore 
to fulfil to put their knowledge and skills at the service of 
the good of the patient, based on a relationship of trust 
between both. For Pellegrino and Thomasma7, trusting 
someone implies becoming vulnerable and dependent 
on the good intentions of the person we trust. This fact is 
even more notorious and has deeper consequences when 
we find ourselves in states or phases of life of greater 
dependence and weakness, as occurs in illness, childhood, 
or old age. If we seek help in case of illness, which may 
involve anxiety, pain, or suffering, we are obliged to trust 
that the professionals we turn to have made a solemn 
commitment to take care of us and that they will protect 
our vulnerability7. In clinical practice this relationship of 
trust has an intrinsic therapeutic value and includes the 
fulfilment of some more trivial promises (e.g., I will come 
back later to talk to you) which, if made, must be fulfilled.
One of the consequences of the decline in trusting 
doctors in recent decades is the determination of a growing 
number of patients to do their own research on the symptoms 
they present, doing tests or even experimenting with certain 
treatments on their own initiative, or even resorting to 
alternative therapies, most of them lacking scientific 
credibility. This is a model, in our view unsatisfactory, 
in which the doctor plays the role of a mere technician 
or service provider, being a simple resource among many 
others. On the part of the doctor, this climate of mistrust 
and latent hostility promotes a defensive decision making 
in order to avoid the risk of lawsuits, which in the American 
context are often motivated by economic purposes, aiming 
at a large compensation, and not for a real feeling of having 
been the victim of an act of negligence or bad clinical 
practice. However, as Bernard Lown22 points out, studies 
have systematically demonstrated that patients are more 
likely to initiate a lawsuit against healthcare professionals, 
not so much because of medical error, but because they are 
displeased with communication and lack of empathy in the 
doctor-patient relationship.
It is understandable that the trust patients place 
in the doctor does not automatically arise because the 
doctor is a specialist or competent in a particular scientific 
area. It develops through dialogue during the clinical 
encounter, from the first moment, and grows up over 
time. It does not confer privileges to the professional but 
brings responsibilities and values patient’s autonomy7. 
However, trust is fragile and can be easily broken by some 
failures on the part of the physician, such as not clarifying 
doubts or questions posed by the patient about the clinical 
problem that concerns them or not providing the results 
of an analysis or examination already performed. In the 
clinical context, it may lead to the patient’s concealment 
of some details of the history of the present disease that 
could be determinant to reach the correct diagnosis and 
begin appropriate treatment.
A trust-based approach is clearly a virtue ethics, 
as it does not depend only on the legalistic fulfilment 
of principles or deontological duties, but also on the 
character of the professional. The alternative to the solemn 
commitment to promote the patient’s good (fidelity to trust) 
is to reduce the medical act to a mere commercial contract, 
considering healthcare as a consumer product and providing 
managers to monitor and supervise the work of healthcare 
professionals.
Compassion
The word compassion is composed from the Greek 
words com (with, together) and pathos (feeling, to suffer). 
For Pellegrino23, it denotes some understanding of what it 
means for the other person to be sick, as well as a readiness 
to help and to see the situation from the perspective of 
the patient. There are many studies that highlight the 
importance of compassion or empathy in the context of 
healthcare, particularly in terms of greater adherence to 
therapy, greater overall patient and doctor satisfaction, 
lower risk of medical burnout, and a decrease in the number 
of lawsuits for medical malpractice12. If compassion is not 
present in the medical act, there is the risk of treating the 
patient coldly and distantly, as an object of clinical curiosity.
Compassion incorporates an ethical dimension, 
which has to do with the commitment adopted by the 
doctor to use their professional skills to promote complete 
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restoration of the patient’s health. It also includes an 
intellectual dimension, which consists of an objective and 
rational evaluation of the patient’s problem, in view of its 
resolution, tempered by recognition and respect for their 
life history, language, feelings and values7. However, an 
excessive identification of the clinician with the suffering 
of a certain patient can be counterproductive, as it can limit 
their professional responsibility towards this patient, by 
hindering the necessary discernment for a correct diagnosis 
and the choice of the most appropriate therapy7. Therefore, 
many codes of medical ethics and deontology recommend 
that, in general, doctors should not treat their own relatives.
Pellegrino and Thomasma7 stress that there must be 
a balance between the virtue of compassion and technical 
and scientific competence, being the virtue of prudence 
the middle ground in this relationship. Moreover, it is 
important to mention that these authors value competence 
in clinical practice in such a way that they consider it a 
moral imperative and are aware that there are occasions 
when competence should prevail. For example, in a delicate 
surgical intervention such as a coronary artery bypass 
grafting or the repair of an aortic aneurysm.
Prudence
This moral and intellectual virtue, called phronesis 
by Aristotle, represents practical wisdom, that is, the ability 
to discern which path is best to follow, after pondering the 
circumstances involved at a given moment. In the context 
of medicine, it is the virtue of prudence that makes clinical 
judgment possible, leading to the correct diagnosis and 
institution of the best therapy for real people, debilitated 
by disease, taking into consideration their personal history 
and value system, as well as the uncertainty inherent to 
any medical act7.
It is an indispensable virtue for the practice of 
medicine, since every medical act involves an intellectual 
and an ethical dimension, and prudence allows the 
integration of technical and scientific competence with the 
hierarchy of values. A decision may be medically correct 
from the scientific point of view, but it will only be a 
decision ethically acceptable if it takes into consideration 
the value system of the individual patient. In this sense, 
prudence is one of the most important virtues and is present 
in all decisions that are made in medical practice.
Up until the 1970s, patients usually accepted 
doctors’ decisions in a passive way, what has been called 
medical paternalism. Nowadays, the respect for the patient’s 
autonomy requires the obtaining of a free and informed 
consent before any medical act, as well as the acceptance 
of the patient’s freely expressed will not to undergo a 
certain medical or surgical treatment, even if this decision 
may reduce their life expectancy7. Occasionally, when the 
clinician anticipates that disclosing complete information 
of the patient’s medical condition may lead them to despair 
and to commit self-harm or suicide, it may be legitimate to 
resort to the so-called therapeutic privilege, and it should 
be postponed to a more favourable occasion7. This attitude 
is distinct from the so-called noble-pious lies, which for 
many years had been common practice with patients with 
severe diseases and poor prognosis. It was given more 
importance to the Hippocratic principle of confidentiality 
than to the virtue of truthfulness, since it was thought that 
revealing the truth would be harmful to the patient. Since 
the 1970s, with the recognition of the patient’s autonomy 
and the legal obligation of obtaining informed consent, 
this attitude of concealing the truth has fortunately been 
abandoned. In the process of acquiring consent the virtue 
of prudence must be present so that the doctor transmits to 
the patient balanced information (neither insufficient nor 
excessive) and at the appropriate time (neither too soon nor 
too late), with respect for his autonomy and vulnerability.
Justice
Justice is one of the four prima facie principles 
proposed by Beauchamp and Childress, being the only 
one that is simultaneously a virtue. Justice as a virtue 
is a trait of character and can be defined as the habit of 
retributing or giving back to others what is due to them. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma7 consider justice as one of the 
most complex virtues since all human relationships, by 
their very nature, are always imperfect and limited, even 
in ideal circumstances, and it is not possible for someone 
to be overly righteous. These authors7, in the wake of 
Aristotle, distinguish between distributive justice, related 
to the common good, which has to do with the equitable 
distribution of resources according to the principle of 
equality among citizens, and commutative justice, which 
relates to the individual good and requires the doctor to 
consider the specific needs of the patient. However, they 
emphasize that the essence of the virtue of justice always 
resides in the good for the individual, even when public or 
community health issues are discussed7.
The virtue of justice may involve setting priorities 
in patient care. Considering that the available resources 
will always be insufficient, for a population or a country, 
decisions should be based essentially on clinical criteria, 
supported by credible and updated scientific evidence, 
namely in the prescription of medication and the proposal 
of surgeries and other medical acts. However, preference 
should be given to the lowest cost options, which becomes 
even more necessary in situations of economic crisis, 
provided that such a decision is appropriate to the patients’ 
clinical condition and does not endanger their lives. As 
Pellegrino and Thomasma17 point out, the doctor must 
seek diagnostic elegance, which consists in resorting to the 
minimum number of complementary exams necessary for 
diagnosis, as well as therapeutic parsimony, which means 
proposing of treatments that are proven, beneficial and 
effective. These authors24 propose some measures to contain 
health expenditure that could be implemented, instead of the 
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lack public funding of treatments considered indispensable, 
especially for citizens of low socioeconomic status. They 
include the use of less expensive complementary exams, 
if they allow the diagnosis to be made, the elimination of 
unnecessary exams and interventions, such as those carried 
out in the context of defensive medicine, the use of less 
expensive therapeutic approaches, although of proven 
efficacy, or the non-reimbursement of aesthetic treatments.
Courage
Pellegrino and Thomasma7 explain that by including 
courage in the list of medical virtues, they are referring 
to moral courage, although sometimes it is necessary for 
the doctor to display also physical courage, especially 
in scenarios of war or natural disasters, as well as in the 
exercise of the profession in countries where there are 
potentially serious endemic diseases. The authors recognize 
that this virtue is one of the most neglected and difficult 
to put into practice in contemporary society, following the 
enormous transformations that have occurred in recent 
years in the provision of healthcare, in which there has 
been a decrease in the influence of doctors in relation 
to political and economic agents. The virtue of courage 
consists in defending what is thought to be right and true 
and resisting what is known to be wrong, often against 
indifference, silence, and resignation.
Some behaviors that Pellegrino and Thomasma7 
consider unacceptable, for violating the doctor’s primordial 
commitment to the patient, are his participation in acts 
of torture of prisoners or compulsive internment, in 
psychiatric units, of political dissidents or of citizens hostile 
to a certain political regime. The opposition of doctors 
to these practices or their refusal to obey the orders of 
totalitarian governments will require a high dose of moral 
courage and may involve risk of life. However, these 
are unusual situations in democratic societies, and the 
virtue of courage is most often manifested in the defence 
of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged, in reporting 
fraud or incompetence, in drawing attention to healthcare 
deficiencies, and in the contribution of doctors to the 
public debate regarding the allocation of health resources, 
considering the needs of the most deprived7.
A characteristic of virtues in general, and even 
more notoriously of moral courage, already reported by 
Aristotle, is that it is a voluntary, reflected, individual and 
non-coercive choice, although there may be opposition and 
the risk of possible retaliation. The fear of being the target 
of a lawsuit may lead the clinician to practice defensive 
medicine, requesting unnecessary exams, prescribing 
dispensable treatments, or avoiding intervening in complex 
cases or of poor prognosis. Courage may be required to 
resist the fear of litigation, particularly fierce in American 
society, or not allowing the interference of external factors, 
political or economic, in the relationship of trust that must 
exist between doctor and patient7.
Temperance
In the context of medicine, this virtue can be 
defined as the willingness of the clinician to make 
judicious use of the means provided by modern technology, 
avoiding its excessive or disproportionate use, what 
some call therapeutic obstinacy, or on the contrary, the 
underutilization of resources potentially beneficial to the 
patient7.
Due to the current t, in developed countries, to use 
the entire therapeutic arsenal and state-of-the-art technology 
in patients whose benefit from the use of these means will be 
questionable or marginal, Pellegrino and Thomasma7 argue 
that it is necessary to exercise the virtue of moderation 
to counteract it, not only considering the interest of the 
individual patient but also the social obligation of a 
judicious use of limited resources. However, they argue 
that it is equally intolerable to abandon patients and not 
treat reversible pathologies due to economic constraints 
or complex situations due to the risk of being subject to 
disciplinary or judicial proceedings7. In the opinion of 
these authors24, it is easier for the healthcare professional 
to resort to technology in an attempt to solve a clinical 
problem than to interact with the patient, listening to their 
wishes and answering their questions, as should happen 
with the legal obligation of getting an informed and free 
consent before any type of intervention. The indiscriminate 
use of available techniques may contribute to a greater 
suffering of the patient and his relatives, postponing an 
inevitable death at the cost of reducing his quality of life 
and wasting resources that could benefit patients with 
chronic diseases or better prognosis. It is a form of abuse 
of power, superimposing medical paternalism on respect 
for the autonomy and vulnerability of the patient, which the 
exercise of the virtue of moderation will help to resolve.
Integrity
The word integrity derives from the Latin term 
integritate, which means the state or quality of the whole 
that has all its parts, and which lacks nothing. It includes the 
notions of wholeness, fullness, character of what cannot or 
must not be broken or modified. As a virtue, it encompasses 
the concepts of moral wholeness, honesty, righteousness, 
probity, and impartiality. A person is said to be whole when 
they act according to a certain set of values and moral 
principles, in which they believe, and presents an honest, 
impartial, upright, incorruptible, fair, and true behavior. 
In the exercise of medicine, situations that compromise 
the moral integrity of the doctor or the patient should be 
avoided, in respect for the value system of each one7.
The clinical decision must be consistent, rigorous, 
and rational, based on anamnesis, physical examination, 
and possible complementary examinations, so that the 
doctor should not be a simple technician or bureaucrat. The 
doctor will make decisions according to their knowledge 
and conscience, not yielding to pressures nor any kind of 
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bribe. It will be unacceptable for the physician to accept 
any payment, whether in goods or money, to facilitate the 
scheduling of an appointment, examination, or surgery. 
Likewise, doctors should not prescribe superfluous 
medication, request unnecessary complementary diagnostic 
tests, or propose unnecessary clinical procedures or 
surgeries. In the private healthcare sector, or when the 
remuneration is dependent on productivity, there may 
sometimes be the temptation to perform complementary 
exams, surgical interventions or treatments which are 
superfluous, in view of the financial compensations. 
However, one should not fall into the opposite error 
of failing to do what must be done, for the benefit of 
the patient, which may constitute medical negligence. 
According to Pellegrino and Thomasma7, doctors are sued 
for doing too much or too little.
Doctors manifesting integrity will avoid situations 
where conflicts of interest may arise, particularly with the 
pharmaceutical industry, and will never accept the intrusion 
of these companies in their clinical activity. Likewise, they 
will avoid promiscuous or non-transparent relationships 
with the industry when conducting clinical trials or 
publishing the results of such studies in scientific journals25.
Altruism
Altruism or self-effacement, that is, putting the 
good of the patient above personal interest and without 
expecting any compensation is, according to Pellegrino 
and Thomasma7, one of the most difficult and least popular 
virtues in the practice of medicine in contemporary 
society. In the current context of market economy, with 
the progressive commercialization of healthcare, even in 
the public sector, altruism and beneficence are devalued, 
while there is a legitimization of self-interest and economic 
prosperity. The authors recognize that society continues to 
disapprove and penalize certain acts that are recognized 
as immoral in medical practice, such as incompetence, 
fraud, deceit, illicit use of funds, breach of confidentiality 
or sexual abuse. However, what worries them most are 
certain practices that are on the fringes of morality, many 
of them legal, accepted and tolerated by modern society, 
such as restrictions on access to healthcare services by the 
poorest citizens, without health insurance or other forms 
of conventional medicine, or the abandonment of more 
complex cases or of poor prognosis by the emergency 
services, in order to avoid the risks of malpractice lawsuits. 
Such practices and attitudes are in a grey zone where the 
boundaries between right and wrong are blurred but are 
still ethically questionable7.
Altruism is not an absolute value, but when present 
in professional practice it confers greater authenticity to 
the doctor-patient relationship and greater independence 
from economic constraints. This is because there are 
potential conflicts of interest in the clinical encounter, 
between the individual interest of the doctor and his 
responsibility towards the patient. Such conflicts are not 
only financial, but may involve the family, the profession, 
the academy, or even political parties and trade unions, 
which can undermine the doctor’s primary commitment 
to the individual patient. As Pellegrino and Thomasma24 
recall, for centuries, good physicians have treated patients 
who could not pay, have exposed themselves to contagion 
or physical harm in responding to the call of the sick, 
and have sacrificed their leisure and time with their own 
families – sometimes too liberally – all out of commitment 
to serve the good of the sick. Indeed, it is this effacement 
of self-interest that distinguishes a true profession from a 
business or craft.
Virtue-based ethical decisions are an example of 
supererogatory acts, that is, acts that are beyond what 
is required by duty7. No healthcare professional will be 
praised for complying with the rules and duties addressed in 
the Code of Ethics of the Medical and Nursing Associations, 
but rather for seeking ethical and moral excellence in their 
conduct.
However, it is not only healthcare professionals who 
should manifest virtues in the clinical relationship. There 
are virtues that patients must reveal to fulfil the purposes of 
medicine, such as honesty in disclosing their clinical history, 
without omission or distortion of facts, or moderation with 
respect to eating habits, alcohol consumption, tobacco 
avoidance and sedentarism. According to Lázaro and 
Gracia26, the traditional idea of a good patient is that of 
someone docile, submissive, respectful, obedient to the 
doctor’s indications and not asking too many questions. 
It is like the expectations that many parents idealize in 
relation to their children. For Pellegrino and Thomasma7, 
this paternalistic model of the doctor-patient relationship 
is not legitimate and has never been, and they maintain 
that patients have duties and responsibilities in their 
clinical encounters, and must manifest virtues such as 
integrity, justice, tolerance, trust, benevolence, humility, 
and courage, in addition to the honesty and moderation 
already mentioned.
To practice medicine with competence, tempered 
by the virtues we have described, is more difficult and 
demanding, but it is the best way to professional satisfaction 
in exercising the noble profession of medicine.
CONCLUSION
Dr. House, a character from the popular TV series, 
portrays a certain way of practicing medicine in our time. 
Famous for his irreverence, assertiveness, and brilliance 
in the way he solves the rarest and most complex medical 
problems, he reveals a deep lack of character in his 
relationships with colleagues, with other professionals and 
with the patients themselves27.
All patients wish to be treated by the best 
professionals, competent in the specialty they have 
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embraced, outstanding performers of the most modern 
and sophisticated technologies, recognized by their peers 
due to academic and professional successes. However, 
they also wish to be cared for by doctors whom they can 
trust, who know how to listen to them with attention and 
empathy, who can answer their doubts and concerns in a 
satisfactory manner. In short, patients wish to be treated 
with the dignity and respect they deserve, and not as objects 
of clinical curiosity or source of income.
What kind of doctors do we want? How would 
we like to be attended and treated when we need medical 
assistance? Certainly, Pellegrino’s28 description meets 
the wishes of most people. If we can choose, we would 
certainly like to be treated by a virtuous physician, a 
“good physician”, one who does his work well, who 
understands your vulnerability, professes to be able to 
help and is faithful to that promise. What you do not want 
is the entrepreneur, the businessman, the technician, the 
bureaucrat, the jobholder, the man who presumes to know 
it all or sees you as an object of exploitation.
Deontological codes and professional ethics do not 
ensure that medical practice is always well-intentioned and 
exemplary, because the basic element of the exercise of the 
profession is, as it has always been, the character of the 
healthcare professional, with virtues being the ethical and 
moral foundation of their activity. Thus, the exercise of 
medicine and healthcare based on a virtue-ethics approach 
is fundamental for a more humane medical practice 
that takes into account the patient’s good, and will also 
contribute to counterbalance the hegemony of principlism 
and ethical theories that devalue the central role of the agent 
in contemporary moral philosophy and bioethics.
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